A cavallo tra i due concili di Costanza e Basilea, che hanno fortemente influito sul giudizio della Chiesa in relazione alle donne visionarie, si staglia la figura di Francesca Bussa dei Ponziani. Le visioni politiche di Francesca rappresentano un fulgido esempio di come i modelli brigidini e cateriniani siano stati ripresi e rimodellati su un nuovo, mutato contesto storico. La sua consolidata autorità le consentì di ammonire a più riprese papa Eugenio IV riguardo alla sua partecipazione al concilio di Basilea, (...) intervenendo attivamente nello scenario religioso e politico romano. (shrink)

The focus of this paper is the prima facie plausible view, expressed by the principle of Counter-Closure, that knowledge-yielding competent deductive inference must issue from known premises. I construct a case that arguably falsifies this principle and consider five available lines of response that might help retain Counter-Closure. I argue that three are problematic. Of the two remaining lines of response, the first relies on non-universal intuitions and forces one to view the case I construct as exhibiting a justified, true (...) belief to which none of the usual diagnoses of knowledge failure in Gettier cases apply. The second line involves claiming that Fake Barns and its ilk are misdiagnosed by epistemological orthodoxy as Gettier cases. We are thus confronted by a trilemma: either the case I discuss undermines the first-blush plausible principle of Counter-Closure; or the case I discuss instantiates a novel kind of Gettier case; or a popular conception of a key range of alleged Gettier cases must be rejected. No matter which horn we choose, the case points to a philosophically curious conclusion. (shrink)

Epistemic injustice is a widely discussed phenomenon in many sub-disciplines (including epistemology, ethics, feminist philosophy, social and political philosophy). Yet, there is very little literature on its connection to the philosophy of sports. Here I explore the intersection between epistemic injustice and sports, focusing on testimonial injustice. I argue that there exist clear-cut cases of testimonial injustice in sport that arise when athletes attempt to communicate information. After highlighting the theoretical connections between various cases, I explore the more ambitious claim (...) that sport performances themselves carry linguistic content. This claim allows us to see the biased negative judgment of sport performances in a new light, as constituting a further and distinctive form of testimonial injustice. I show how the case of figure-skater Surya Bonaly can be understood as a real-life instantiation of this form of testimonial injustice. I conclude by explaining why it is philosophically fruitful to understand these wrongs through the lens of testimonial injustice. (shrink)

El propósito de este escrito es el análisis de las estructuras organizacionales inherentes a las instituciones de educación superior desde un marco conceptual específico: la complejidad. El escrito se estructura en torno a la delimitación de algunas tensiones que descubren los principales nodos de discusión sobre las organizaciones universitarias, siempre desde un enfoque complejo. El objetivo es validar argumentos desde la teoría como vector de análisis, de modo que su lectura pueda producir una suerte de heurística sobre el tema.

According to the received view in epistemology, inferential knowledge from non-knowledge is impossible – that is, in order for a subject to know the conclusion of their inference, they must know the essential premises from which that conclusion is drawn. In this book, Federico Luzzi critically examines this view, arguing that it is less plausible than intuition suggests and that it can be abandoned without substantial cost. In a discussion that ranges across inference, testimony and memory he analyses the (...) full range of challenges to the view, connecting them to epistemological cases that support those challenges. He then proposes a defeater-based framework which allows the phenomenon of knowledge from non-knowledge across these three epistemic areas to be better understood. His book will be of interest to a wide range of readers in epistemology. (shrink)

According to the principle of Knowledge Counter-Closure , knowledge-yielding single-premise deduction requires a known premise: if S believes q solely on the basis of deduction from p, and S knows q, then S must know p. Although prima facie plausible, widely accepted, and supported by seemingly compelling motivations, KCC has recently been challenged by cases where S arguably knows q solely on the basis of deduction from p, yet p is false or p is true but not known . I (...) explore a view that resolves this tension by abandoning KCC in the light of these challenges, and which acknowledges their force but also their limits. Adopting this view helps identify the epistemic constraints that operate on the premises of knowledge-yielding deduction, clarifies the epistemic role of deduction, and allows us to distil the kernel of truth in the motivations that are standardly taken to support KCC. (shrink)

Miranda Fricker has influentially discussed testimonial injustice: the injustice done to a speaker S by a hearer H when H gives S less-than-merited credibility. Here, I explore the prospects for a novel form of testimonial injustice, where H affords S due credibility, that is, the amount of credibility S deserves. I present two kinds of cases intended to illustrate this category, and argue that there is presumptive reason to think that testimonial injustice with due credibility exists. I show that if (...) it is denied that ultimately these cases exemplify testimonial injustice without credibility deficit, then either they must be taken to exemplify a novel kind of epistemic, non-testimonial injustice, or they bring to light a significant exegetical result. (shrink)

Martínková et al provide an overview of a tendency to use gender terms in key sports contexts, including eligibility criteria and testing, where gender is unintended. They argue that to avoid conceptual confusion and aid clarity, we should disentangle gender and sex, acknowledging that often gender talk should be interpreted as talk of sex. One of their recommendations is that the labels of competitive categories ‘women’s’/’men’s’ should change to ‘female’/’male’. I first make their argument against gendered labelling more precise by (...) showing that important yet neglected moral and practical reasons support their abandonment. I then argue that in the case of WA regulations, those moral reasons also cut against Martínková et al.’s relabelling proposal ‘female’/’male’. I sketch a testosterone-based proposal which circumvents the problem and which WA itself should accept. More generally, I argue we should be more mindful of the risk that competitive category labels unnecessarily harm athletes. (shrink)

I argue that patients who suffer genital surgery to ‘disambiguate’ their sexual anatomy, a practice labelled ‘intersex genital mutilation’ by intersex advocates, can be understood as victims of hermeneutical injustice in the sense elaborated by Miranda Fricker. This claim is clarified and defended from two objections. I further argue that a particular subset of cases of IGM-based hermeneutical injustice instantiate a novel form of hermeneutical injustice, which I call deception-based hermeneutical injustice. I highlight how this differs from central types of (...) hermeneutical injustice in the literature and trace its harms. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Fricker’s influential account of testimonial injustice (hereafter ‘TI’) should be expanded to include cases of TI from mutually neutralising countervailing prejudices. In this kind of case, the hearer is given due credibility by the speaker. I describe a relevant case, defend it from objections, highlight how it differs from extant cases of due-credibility TI and describe its distinctive features. This case demonstrates how paying attention to the way multiple prejudices operate in concert leads to (...) expanding the repertoire of cases of TI and casts light on the harms of TI. (shrink)

Fricker has proposed that a hearer’s knowledge that p acquired through trusting a speaker requires the speaker to know that p, and that therefore testimonial knowledge through trust is necessarily second-hand knowledge. In this paper, I argue that Fricker’s view is problematic for four reasons: firstly, Fricker’s dismissal of a central challenge to the second-handedness of testimonial knowledge is based on a significant misrepresentation of this challenge; secondly, on closer scrutiny an important distinction Fricker wants to draw is compromised by (...) her account of trust; thirdly, Fricker’s conception of trust is at odds with our natural understanding of this notion; fourthly, the reasons Fricker cites in support of her view are not sufficient to single out her view as the correct one, since rival views can also accommodate the relevant data. (shrink)

I argue that DeRose's attributor contextualism cannot straightforwardly preserve the widespread view that, when a subject believes q solely on the basis of competent deduction from p, knowledge of q requires knowledge of p. I present a novel challenge to the compatibility of this widespread view with DeRose's contextualism, then argue that the tension can be resolved in only one of two ways: if DeRose rejects the widespread view or if DeRose accepts the existence of a range of contextualism-specific Gettier-style (...) cases. (shrink)

Crispin Wright has articulated and defended the view that by incorporating non-evidential entitlements into our theory of knowledge, we can achieve a satisfactory reply to key skeptical challenges. Crucial to this view is the thesis that regions of thought are underpinned by ‘cornerstone’ propositions— propositions for which warrant is antecedently required in order for ordinary beliefs in that region to be supported by experiential evidence. Critics have noted that because cornerstone propositions are entailed by ordinary propositions, Closure delivers two unwelcome (...) results: (i) one can acquire evidential justification for cornerstones via deduction (alchemy); and (ii) the epistemic risk involved in accepting cornerstone propositions impugns the evidential justification we are supposed to have for ordinary propositions (leaching). It is argued here that leaching has been misdiagnosed by Wright and his critics as relying essentially on a Closure principle. Instead, it relies on a Counter-Closure-style principle. Once this point is recognized , Wright’s own solution to the leaching problem becomes unsatisfactory. However, a guiding maxim from the extant literature for demarcating true from false Counter-Closure-style principles can be usefully applied to identify a successful resolution to the leaching worry on Wright’s behalf. (shrink)

The principle of Counter-Closure embodies the widespread view that when a proposition is believed solely as the conclusion of single-premise deduction, it can be known only if the premise is also known. I raise a problem for the compatibility of Jason Stanley's Interest-Relative Invariantism (IRI) with Counter-Closure. I explore the landscape of options that might help Stanley resolve this tension and argue that a trilemma confronts Stanley: he must either (i) renounce a key intuition that lies at the foundation of (...) his view; or (ii) admit into his epistemology an IRI-specific novel brand of Gettier case; or (iii) abandon Counter-Closure. (shrink)

The motive for late eighteenth-century proto-technics of photography and cinema was never quite mimetic representation: it was generating autonomous impressions of natural phenomena within the tradition ofNaturphilosophie. The article analyses a series of connections between ‘natural hieroglyphs’ (von Lichtenberg), Jacques-Alexandre-César Charles’s ‘megascope’, Wedgwood’s pre-photography, Lavater’s silhouettes and antecedents of Marey’s ‘graphic method’. The goal is to document precursor ideas, devices, setups and frameworks of photoimaging medias to show that the genealogy of photography and cinema intersected through many polymath transverses within (...) the ambit of natural philosophy (and the context of slavery). (shrink)

1. t. Viduramžiai, Renesansas, Naujieji amžiai.

Calls to decolonise education systems cannot be removed from broader social struggles. Scholars have engaged in theoretical discussions on what decolonisation entails, emphasising the need for transforming thoughts, beliefs, and practices. However, the lack of sustained engagement and widespread resistance to decolonising the curriculum remains evident (Shahjahan, Estera & Surla, 2021; Fataar, 2018; Margolis, 2001), underscoring the urgency to envision new futures and explore relationalities between educators and students.In this article, we delve into the evolving terminologies surrounding Decolonisation, Anti-Colonisation and (...) Indigenisation, emphasising their pivotal roles in the broader project of educational decolonisation (Louie et al., 2017). We argue that a reassertion of Indigenous resistance and futurity in higher education forms the cornerstone of this transformative process. Through an examination and understanding of these terminologies, we aim to contribute to the ongoing dialogue surrounding educational decolonisation and envision inclusive, equitable, and anti-colonial learning environments that center Indigenous knowledge and perspectives. (shrink)

The topic of safeguarding against sickness grew in importance during the COVID-19 pandemic. People’s health was more at risk, yet not all had the same capacity and options to deal with it. Therefore, this article focuses on the under-researched topic of choice of strategies and individual practices for safeguarding against one’s sickness among micro-entrepreneurs (with 1–10 employees) before and during the pandemic, namely on the example of Czechia. We analyse 30 qualitative interviews with micro-entrepreneurs to demonstrate how their social location (...) affects the attainability of strategies and individual practices for that purpose. It is primarily their family role (breadwinner vs caregiver) that, along with socioeconomic status, either limits or opens choices of strategies and individual practices or combinations thereof. Although the COVID-19 pandemic posed a high health risk to the entire society, it did not bring the micro-entrepreneurs to revise their often-risky choices in safeguarding against sickness. In contrast, it highlighted some specifics of micro-enterprises, e.g. their unclear organisational structure, which proved a high risk in the context of the health crisis. (shrink)

Keď sa ľudia nachádzajú medzi inými, správajú sa viac prosociálne, morálne a štedro. Čo však môže ovplyvniť ich správanie v momente, keď sú sami? Aby sa správali ako medzi inými? Jedna z možností môže byť vyvolať pocit, že sa niekto pozerá. Tento účel môže splniť aj obyčajné zrkadlo. Naše výskumy podporujú vplyv zrkadla na dodržiavanie pravidla na súboroch dospelých a detí. V obidvoch experimentoch prítomnosť zrkadla zvyšovala šancu na dodržiavanie stanoveného pravidla. Ako však niečo tak jednoduché ako zrkadlo môže ovplyvniť (...) správanie? Jeden z prístupov tvrdí, že vizuálny stimul spustí automatickú percepciu „niekto sa pozerá“, aj napriek tomu, že je to iba odraz v zrkadle. Ďalší možný prístup vychádza z predpokladu, že na seba upriamená pozornosť vyvoláva sebauvedomovanie, pričom sa zviditeľňuje prípadný rozpor medzi konaním a štandardom. Porušenie pravidla v takom momente by mohlo ohroziť sebaúctu. V treťom prístupe autori vychádzajú z princípu negatívnej spätnej väzby. Nakoniec by sme radi spomenuli naše experimenty a navrhli ďalšie možnosti skúmania v tejto oblasti. (shrink)